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The significance of this case is the fact that an imputation of false
swearing does not have to amount to an accusation of perjury in order to
be actionable per se. The words spoken do not need to refer to a judicial
proceeding directly. However, it would appear that the accusation must
clearly suggest that the plaintiff swore falsely while under oath.
Neal v. Burch7s is the only case this researcher has found to have been
decided under section 2. The statement in question charged that the de-
fendant had sworn to lie and that his affidavit was false. The declaration of
the plaintiff had alleged that, under section 2 of the Slander and Libel
Act, such an accusation was actionable per se. The court held that under
section 2 it was not necessary to charge that the defendant's statements were
made of and concerning any judicial proceeding or any action, time, or
transaction requiring that an affidavit be made. It was sufficient that the
utterance alleged false swearing in a general manner and not in connection
with a particular occasion when the plaintiff was under oath.
There is little case law in Illinois dealing with this category since most
of the suits involving such actionable words are brought against attorneys
regarding their language in the courtroom. Such cases are resolved on the
basis of the privilege granted to attorneys during a trial and, therefore, do
not involve the actionability of the words in question.
MICHAEL D. SAVAGE
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LIBEL DEFINED
Libel is generally defined as "a malicious publication, expressed either
in printing or writing, or by signs and pictures, tending either to blacken
the memory of one who is dead, or the reputation of one who is alive, and
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule."' Until January 1, 1962,
a similar, though broader, definition could be found in the Illinois criminal
statutes.2 This statutory definition of criminal libel was generally appli-
cable to civil as well as criminal actions in Illinois.3 The most recent Illinois
78 184 Ill. App. 289 (3d Dist. 1913).
1 33 Am. Jur., Libel & Slander § 3 (1941); cited in Cowper v. Vanier, 20 Ill. App. 2d
499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (3d Dist. 1959).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 402 (1961): "A libel is a malicious defamation, expressed
either by printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory
of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation or publish
the natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, con-
tempt, ridicule, or financial injury." Repealed by Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 35-1 (1961). The
1961 Criminal Code does not define libel, but contains the offense of Criminal Defamation
in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 27-1(a) (1961).
3 See, e.g., Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Proesel v. Myers Publishing
Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 501, 165 N.E.2d 352 (1st Dist. 1960).
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decision defining libel and slander is Whitby v. Associates Discount Corpo-
ration,4 wherein the Appellate Court recites the Restatement of Torts defi-
nition of defamation 5 and then states that libel is a defamatory communi-
cation designed for visual perception, and slander is an oral defamatory
communication.6
LIBEL PER SE-LIBEL PER QUOD
The meanings of the expressions "libel per se" and "libel per quod"
have eluded many law students and lawyers. A clear understanding of these
terms and their applicability is essential to a discussion of the development
of the law of libel in Illinois.
The common law rule was that all libel was actionable without the
requirement of pleading or proving that the plaintiff had in fact suffered
any damage as a result of it. 7 However, in the development of this rule in
the United States, a majority of jurisdictions came to distinguish between
libel that was defamatory on its face, or "libel per se," and libel not de-
famatory on its face, or "libel per quod."8 In the former, damage was pre-
sumed; in the latter, the plaintiff was required to establish that he had
suffered special damages to state a cause of action.
Illinois does not follow the common law rule stated above. As will be
seen from the Illinois decisions, libel per se language in Illinois is that
which is defamatory on its face, i.e., where the words themselves, without
resort to outside circumstances, tend to hold the plaintiff up to scorn, ridi-
cule, contempt, and so forth, and are embodied in some permanent physical
form. For example, in an 1891 case, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
words labelling the plaintiff as an "anarchist" were libelous per se because
the public had feelings of hatred and contempt for persons advocating
the overthrow of government; 9 the words were therefore defamatory on
their face. On the other hand, sixty years later an article naming a person
as one of the "subversive leaders in the United States" was declared not
defamatory on its face and therefore not libelous per se. In that case, the
Appellate Court said that the words used did not charge the plaintiff with
4 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482 (3d Dist. 1965).
5 "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another
as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from asso-
dating or dealing with him." 3 Restatement, Torts § 559 (1938).
6 Whitby v. Associates Discount Corporation, supra note 4. Consider the impact of
this statement on the troublesome question of distinguishing between libel and slander
with respect to television and radio. Prosser, Torts 771 (3d ed. 1964).
7 Prosser, Torts 780 (3d ed. 1964). Prosser further notes that this is the English
view, the law in a small minority of American jurisdictions, and the position adopted by
the Restatement of Torts § 569. On whether or not this rule is a minority, majority, or
"trend" in American jurisdictions, see Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod,
79 Harv. L. Rev. 733 (1966).
S Prosser, Torts 782 (3d ed. 1964).
9 Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 692 (1891).
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a crime of treason or sedition, nor was it stated that plaintiff was a Commu-
nist or a Fascist, or an adherent of those philosophies. 10 Such reasoning by
the court indicates that the use of a particular label, such as Communist, or
Nazi, would be a requirement to sustain a cause of action for libel without
the necessity of showing special damages. It is fairly obvious that an impor-
tant factor to consider in connection with these types of cases would be the
role of the subversive group in the current political scene."
Libel per quod language in Illinois is that which is defamatory only
as the result of the existence of outside circumstances or extrinsic facts,
which "were necessary to prove -the imputation conveyed."'12 In the libel
per quod situation, the plaintiff is required to allege and prove special
damages, unless the language used comes within one of the following cate-
gories:' 3 imputation of crime, imputation of certain diseases, imputation
tending to prejudice a person in his business, trade, profession or office, and
imputation of unchastity to a woman.
One Illinois case has apparently departed from the foregoing distinc-
tion between libel per se and libel per quod. The Whitby case, after noting
that the rules applicable to slander are applicable to libel as well, contains
the following statement:
... a written publication of false words in order to be libelous per
se must ...by their plain, unambiguous and ordinary meaning,
and without resort to innuendo or construction, be injurious on
their face and impute some matter falling within the first four
categories of offensive material .... Any other kind of libel is re-
garded as one per quod, and, like slander, in every instance re-
quires allegations and proof of special damages. 14
Thus, this case says that words may be injurious on their face and result in
seriously affecting the character of an individual, but if the words do not
fall within one of the categories of offensive material, this would be a libel
per quod situation and proof of special pecuniary damage is necessary to
sustain a recovery. 1 Whether or not this pronouncement on the meaning
10 Dilling v. Illinois Publishing & Printing Co., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N.E.2d 635 (1st
Dist. 1950).
11 Cf. Prosser, Torts 761 (3d ed. 1964). With respect to defamatory labels, Prosser
says: "The line is drawn, however, when the group who will be unfavorably impressed
becomes so small as to be negligible, or one whose standards are so clearly anti-social that
the court may not properly consider them. The state of mind of the particular community
must of course be taken into account, as well as its fluctuations over a period of time ... "
12 Prosser, Torts 782 (3d ed. 1964). Footnote 31 on page 782 in Mr. Prosser's treatise
refers to what he calls "the classic case of libel per quod," citing Morrison v. Ritchie &
Co., 4 Fraser, Sess. Cas., 645, 39 Scot. L. Rep. 432 (1902), "where defendant's newspaper
published a report that the plaintiff had given birth to twins. There were readers who
knew that she had been married only one month."
13 Prosser, Torts 782 (3d ed. 1964).
14 Whitby v. Associates Discount Corporation, 59 Ill. App. 2d 337, 341, 207 N.E.2d
482, 485 (3d Dist. 1965).
15 Ibid.
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of libel per se of the Whitby case can be relied upon as the law in Illinois
is open to question, since the opinion is from the third appellate district.
More specifically, the absence of any reference to the old criminal code
definition of libel, which has been used in civil cases, leads one to ponder
whether or not the old meaning of libel per se is abolished in the third
appellate district, and what influence the Whitby rule of libel per se will
have on civil libel actions in the entire judicial system of Illinois. The court
deciding the Whitby case, in attempting to clarify the libel per se-libel
per quod distinction in Illinois, did more than what most Illinois courts
have done with this subject. It is unfortunate that the Illinois court opin-
ions fail to treat this cloudy area of tort law with greater depth, clarity and
understanding.
THE CATEGORIES
As we have seen above, libel is not actionable unless special damages
are alleged and proved, with the exception that words are actionable if
they are defamatory or injurious on their face and, following the Whitby
rule of libel per se, come within one of the categories of offensive material.
The traditional or common law categories are: 1) imputation of crime,
2) imputation of certain diseases, and 3) imputation tending to prejudice a
person in his business, trade, or profession or office. A fourth category,
imputation of unchastity to a woman, was added later by some jurisdic-
tions.' 6 Illinois adopted these categories years ago,17 and recent decisions
still follow this basic outline, although new categories or extensions of the
traditional categories have developed as a result of changes in society.'
5
A determination of what form words must take to satisfy these categories,
thereby relieving a plaintiff from alleging and proving special damages,
is the task before the court in many libel cases.
IMPUTATION OF CRIME
The class of words imputing the commission of a crime is probably
the category arising most often in the Illinois courts. In determining
16 Prosser, Torts 772 (3d ed. 1964). While noting that the origin of the categories is
in doubt, Mr. Prosser says that they probably developed because of the common recog-
nition that such words might cause pecuniary loss.
17 Wright v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill. App. 495 (4th Dist. 1935); Hudson v.
Slack Furniture Co., 318 Ill. App. 15, 47 N.E.2d 502 (4th Dist. 1943).
18 See generally, 33 I.L.P., Slander And Libel §§ 21-27 (1958). See also Ill. Rev. Stat.
ch. 126 § 1 (1965): "That if any person shall falsely use, utter or publish words, which
in their common acceptance, shall amount to charge any person with having been guilty
of fornication or adultery, such words so spoken shall be deemed actionable, and he shall
be deemed guilty of slander"; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 126 § 2 (1965): "It shall be deemed
slander, and shall be actionable, to charge any person with swearing falsely, or with having
sworn falsely, or for using, uttering or publishing words of, to or concerning any person,
which, in their common acceptation, amount to such charge, whether the words be
spoken in conversation of, and concerning a judicial proceeding or not." It would seem
reasonable to include language violating the above statutes within the class of libel
actionable without proof of special damages. However, in Jacksonville Journal Co. v.
Beymer, 42 Ill. App. 443, 447 (3d Dist. 1891), the Appellate Court said, with reference to
§ 1 above: "We regard this provision of the statute as applicable to verbal slander only."
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whether or not certain words are libelous per se, the character or seriousness
of the crime imputed to a person is a major factor considered. Other factors
considered are the exactness of the charge (whether or not a particular crime
is clearly spelled out or only intimated), the punishment for the crime, the
image of the plaintiff portrayed to the public as a result of the charge, and
the person allegedly libelled.
Recent cases where a criminal offense was clearly imputed resulted
in a finding that the words were actionable without proof of special dam-
ages. One of these cases involved a defendant who gave another person
certain police records containing information indicating that a person
having the same name as plaintiff was arrested for gambling. The plaintiff,
who had been conducting a political campaign when the defendant circu-
lated these records, was successful in obtaining a reversal in his favor in the
Appellate Court.19 In the case of Flannery v. Allyn, 20 the imputation con-
tained in a letter written by the defendant to the chief of police that plain-
tiff police officers solicited a bribe, was held to be actionable without proof
of special damages. Similarly, in Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 21 an
article by a society columnist in defendant's newspaper contained a state-
ment that plaintiff's former wife had "started a suit for bigamy." The plain-
tiff alleged that this statement was actionable without proof of special dam-
ages because it charged that the plaintiff had committed the crime of
bigamy, when in fact no type of judicial proceeding was initiated by the
plaintiff's former wife. The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff, de-
ciding that, upon a reading of the article, readers of common and reasonable
understanding would conclude that plaintiff had been charged with the
crime of bigamy.22
On the other hand, libel cases involving language that does not clearly
impute a crime to the plaintiff do not generally fall within the class of libel
actionable without proof of special damages. In Zurawski v. Dziennik
Zjednoczenia Pub. Corp.,23 plaintiff was labelled as a "thief" by the de-
fendant. While calling a person a thief may result in impairing one's repu-
tation, the court said that the word "thief" does not mean that the crime of
larceny was committed by the plaintiff, and that this idea was not conveyed
to readers of the alleged libelous communication. 24 Similarly, in Torrance v.
19 Gargano v. McNerney, 23 Ill. App. 2d 263, 161 N.E.2d 870 (Ist Dist. 1959).
20 47 Ill. App. 2d 308, 198 N.E.2d 563 (lst Dist. 1964).
21 65 Il1. App. 2d 65, 213 N.E.2d 1 (Ist Dist. 1965).
22 Ibid.
23 286 Ill. App. 106, 2 N.E.2d 956 (1st Dist. 1936).
24 Id. at 109, 2 N.E.2d at 958. Cf. Merrill v. Marshall, 113 Ill. App. 447, 450 (Ist Dist.
1904), where the court said: "The word thief, in its ordinary acceptation, imputes the
crime of larceny and is actionable per se; but if the word be spoken of defendant in
relation to a past act or transaction, which was known to the hearers, and which past
act or transaction was not larceny, nor indictable as a crime, the use of the word is not
actionable." It is difficult to reconcile these conflicting views of the word "thief" when one
considers the oft repeated statement that the written word has greater potentialities for
harm than the spoken word. Prosser, Torts 769 (3d ed. 1964).
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City National Bank of Rockford,25 a bank's refusal to honor a check bear-
ing the name of the plaintiff, and the return of the check to a third party
marked "insufficient funds" was held not to have charged the plaintiff with
the criminal act. However, words in a newspaper article stating that plaintiff,
a former public official, had issued a city liquor license after $7,000 changed
hands were held to be actionable without proof of special damages, as they
charged plaintiff with accepting a bribe.28
It is generally accepted that the form of words charging commission of
a crime is not judged by the same technical requirements necessary for an
indictment; thus, words fairly imputing a crime could be held actionable
in themselves. 27
Mr. Prosser suggests that the ultimate test used in determining whether
or not words are libelous per se when imputing the commission of a crime
is whether the words convey the idea of a major social disgrace. 28 The de-
cisions in the above cited Illinois cases could have been reached solely on
the basis of such a consideration.
IMPUTATION OF LOATHSOME DISEASE
The original basis for the category of words, libelous per se, imputing
a loathsome disease was the exclusion from society which would result. The
significant advances in the field of medicine and a greater understanding
of various diseases on the part of the public have accounted for the disap-
pearance of cases under this category, which was originally limited to im-
putation of venereal disease and other contagious and offensive diseases.29
However, the imputation of insanity or impairment of mental faculties by
a statement that a person was recovering from a mental illness, although not
within this category, was held to be actionable without proof of special
damages in a 1959 decision.80 The court reasoned that such a statement
carried the imputation that plaintiff was of an unsound mind and caused
plaintiff to be shunned or avoided by his neighbors and friends. The im-
portant factor to consider was not the degree of the illness, but the "inju-
rious effect created in the minds of :the reader by the printed words."31
25 32 Ill. App. 2d 288, 177 N.E.2d 646 (2d Dist. 1961).
26 Lundstrom v. Winnebago Newspapers, Inc., 42 Ill. App. 2d 306, 192 N.E.2d 307
(2d Dist. 1963). The outcome of this case was finally reached in Lundstrom v. Winnebago
Newspapers, Inc., 58 Ill. App. 2d 33, 206 N.E.2d 525 (2d Dist. 1965), where the Appellate
Court cites New York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 Sup. Ct. 710 (1964),
and says that the complaint did not state a good cause of action because it did not allege
actual malice and consequent special damages. This requirement in cases involving public
officials was established by the New York Times case.
27 Proesel v. Myers Publishing Co., 24 Ill. App. 2d 501, 165 N.E.2d 352 (Ist Dist. 1960).
28 Prosser, Torts 774 (3d ed. 1964).
29 Prosser, Torts 775 (3d ed. 1964).
80 Cowper v. Vannier, 20 Ill. App. 2d 499, 156 N.E.2d 761 (3d Dist. 1959).
81 Id. at 503, 156 N.E.2d at 763. Mr. Prosser says that accusations of insanity are not
included in the loathsome disease category, although the result of such accusation, the
exclusion from society, is the same as a charge of loathsome disease. Prosser, Torts 775
(3d ed. 1964).
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IMPUTATION TENDING TO PREJUDICE PERSON IN His
BUSINESS, TRADE, PROFESSION OR OFFICE
Words prejudicing a person in his business, trade, profession or office
have been the subject of numerous libel cases in Illinois. The decisions
indicate that the alleged defamatory statement, to be actionable without
proof of special damages, must show that the plaintiff's conduct is incom-
patible with the proper conduct of the business. For example, in one case,
a news article implicating an ordained minister in a state investigation in-
volving matters of a scandalous nature was held actionable without proof
of special damages because the conduct ascribed to the minister was incom-
patible with the qualifications a minister should possess. 32 Similarly, con-
duct incompatible with the practice of law by a state's attorney, who was
labelled as an unfair and partial prosecutor, and as guilty of malfeasance
in office and of such conduct unbecoming a member of the legal profession,
was sufficient to warrant a finding that the published language was action-
able without proof of special damages. 33 On the other hand, an article
written by a Chicago newswriter stating that a woman did a strip-tease on
one occasion at plaintiff's business establishment was not actionable without
proof of special damages as to the plaintiffs as individuals, and the court
stated further, that even if the article was considered in connection with
plaintiff's business, there was not any charge that plaintiffs were unfit to
operate their business, nor that they were selling adulterated drinks or
defrauding the public. In short, the article did not charge plaintiffs with
conduct incompatible with the business in which they were engaged.3 4
Since the purpose of this category is to protect persons in their chosen
field, the allegedly libelous language must reasonably tend to harm or
disgrace the plaintiff in his profession in the minds of the public. Thus, in
one case, a female professional entertainer brought an action for libel when
a letter written to the editor of defendant newspaper described plaintiff
as a young girl, half naked and twirling a hula hoop while riding in the
back of a convertible. Actually, the plaintiff was riding in a parade as part
of a campaign 'to advertise a charity dance. On the issue of whether or not
the words written of plaintiff with respect to her calling were actionable
without proof of special damages, the Appellate Court said:
This publication did not expose or tend to expose plaintiff to con-
tempt, ridicule, or disgrace, and did not induce in the minds of
right thinking persons an evil opinion of the plaintiff, or accuse
her of indecent exposure, lewdness, public drunkenness, or injure
her in her profession as charged. In order to make words ... writ-
32 Cobbs v. Chicago Defender, 308 Il1. App. 55, 31 N.E.2d 323 (1st Dist. 1941).
33 People v. Doss, 318 Ill. App. 387, 48 N.E.2d 213 (3d Dist. 1943), aff'd, 384 II1. 400,
51 N.E.2d 517 (1943). Accord, Colmar v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 13 Ill.
App. 2d 267, 141 N.E.2d 652 (1st Dist. 1957).
34 Hambric v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 46 Ill. App. 2d 355, 196 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist.
1964).
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ten ... of, or concerning, a person engaged in a particular calling,
actionable per se, they must be used of the person in relation to
his or her occupation.8 5
The word "liar" was involved in a recent Illinois decision.86 The plain-
tiff in this case was a candidate for public office. An editorial in defendant's
newspaper accused plaintiff of being untruthful in a particular instance.
While recognizing that the word "liar" is not particularly complimentary,
the court said that it does not follow that the use of the word is actionable
without proof of special damages. Taking many factors into consideration,
especially the fact that plaintiff's candidacy for public office subjected
plaintiff and his qualifications to public comment, and that the comment
was not made maliciously, the court held that the word "liar" was not
actionable without proof of special damages.8 7
When the plaintiff in a libel case is a corporation and a derogatory
statement is written in relation to the business, one Illinois decision says
that for such a statement to be actionable without proof of special damages
the corporation's financial position and business methods must be assailed,
or the corporation must be accused of fraud or mismanagement. 88
LIBEL PER QUOD
Many statements allegedly actionable without proof of special damages
contain language that does not properly fall within one of the categories
of offensive material discussed above or the ordinary meaning of the words
used is not injurious on its face. These words are considered libel per
quod,39 and the plaintiff is required to allege and prove special damages.
Representative of such language is the statement in a 1955 case about plain-
tiff, a candidate for public office, being seen by an investigator while receiv-
ing money from the local dog catcher.40 While the language in the state-
ment could prejudice the plaintiff in his profession, the ordinary meaning
of the words used was not actionable without proof of special damages or
85 Archibald v. Belleville News Democrat, 54 Ill. App. 2d 38, 40, 203 N.E.2d 281, 283
(5th Dist. 1964). Cf. Jamison v. Rebenson, 21 Ill. App. 2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 82 (1st Dist.
1959): written statement by defendants, officers and employees of local union, accusing
plaintiff union organizer of making improper advances to females were held to be capable
of a defamatory meaning, since the words could reasonably detract from plaintiff's repu-
tation of good moral character and injure him in his employment.
86 Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co., 56 Ill. App. 2d 101, 205 N.E.2d 44 (3d Dist. 1965).
87 Id. at 108, 205 N.E.2d at 48.
88 Life Printing and Publ. Co., Inc. v. Field, 324 Ill. App. 254, 58 N.E.2d 307 (1st
Dist. 1944).
89 Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 736 (1966),
wherein the writer states: ". . . the rule of libel per quod was spawned by confusion over
such terms as 'actionable per se,' 'libel per se,' 'slander per se,' 'per quod,' and 'innuendo,'
in courts that had no clear understanding of the law of defamation, its historical back-
ground, and the frequently silly distinctions drawn between slander and libel.. . .The
Latin expression 'per quod,' meaning 'whereby,' traditionally introduced the specification
of damages incurred ....
40 Gogerty v. Covins, 5 Ill. App. 2d 74, 124 N.E.2d 602 (3d Dist. 1955).
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injurious on their face. Words referring to the plaintiff as a "Negro" and a
"Chink" were not actionable without proof of special damages in another
case.
4
'
GROUP LIBEL
The problems presented when allegedly libelous statements are di-
rected at a group of persons were highlighted in Latimer v. Chicago Daily
News. 4 2 The plaintiffs in this case were nine attorneys out of a group of
twenty-three attorneys representing certain defendants indicted for con-
spiracy. The language of the news item published by defendant 43 did not
identify any particular plaintiff or plaintiffs, but was only a derogatory
statement written about a group. Without being able to say with certainty
that the plaintiffs were meant to be in the group of attorneys libelled, the
court said that a cause of action for libel did not accrue to individuals
included in the group.44
JACK F. KUHLMAN
SLANDER AND LIBEL DISTINGUISHED
Slander has been defined as "oral defamation; the speaking of false and
malicious words concerning another, whereby injury results to his reputa-
tion."' The definition of libel has been stated to be "a method of defama-
tion expressed by print, writing, pictures or signs." 2 The distinction between
slander and libel has been stated to be that "Libel and slander are both
methods of defamation; the former being expressed in print, writing, pic-
tures or signs; the latter by oral expressions."'3
The aforementioned distinction appears to be fundamentally simple
and uncomplicated. However, the differentiation between slander and libel
has often become a perplexing judicial dilemma. Before analyzing the need
for such distinguishment, it would be helpful to probe into the factors upon
which the distinction has developed. It should be initially stated that the
respective unilateral development of the torts of libel and slander is to the
greatest extent an anomalous, religious, historical, and political accident.
Only through an examination of the treatment given to defamation actions
41 Mitchell v. Tribune Co., 343 Ill. App. 446, 99 N.E.2d 397 (lst Dist. 1951).
42 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N.E.2d 553 (1947).
43 "... [T]he scum of political gangsterdom in this country are represented by as
craven a group of lawyers as I've seen, not excluding the nickel and dime shysters who
used to hang around the racket court on So. State St. as staff attorneys for the gambling
and vice syndicate." Id. at 297, 71 N.E.2d at 554.
44 Id. at 298, 71 N.E.2d at 555. See Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1382 (1960) for discussion of
the right of an individual member of a group to maintain an action for libel.
1 Black, Law Dictionary 1559 (4th ed. 1951).
2 Id. at 1060.
^ Id. at 1559.
